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Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act: The “Good
Samaritan” Law which Grants
Immunity to “Bad Samaritans”
Josh Slovin*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the “world wide web” launched in the public domain,
creating what we call today the “internet.”1 However, the internet was
slow to catch on. In 1996, there were only 20 million American users on
the internet.2 As the adoption of the internet by Americans slowly
increased so did the development of internet websites and internet
services. The United States Congress quickly began to see the pitfalls of
the internet unfolding before its own eyes.3 In effect, the internet
created a new venue for the dissemination of defamatory and elicit
content.4
Beginning in 1991, litigation commenced when individuals sought to
hold internet website providers liable for content created or posted by
third-parties.5 Courts seemingly struggled in assessing liability on the
part of the internet website provider, which led to courts offering
*I would like to thank my Comment advisor, Professor Margaret McCann for her above
and beyond support and assistance throughout the writing process. From being my firstyear professor in Legal Process to my Comment advisor, Professor McCann has truly been
an integral part of my legal writing development.
1. Cern,
Where
the
Web
Was
Born,
CERN,
https://home.cern/science/computing/birth-web/short-history-web (last visited Jan. 21,
2022).
2. Farhad Manjoo, The Internet of 1996 is almost unrecognizable compared with
what we have today, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2009), https://slate.com/technology/2009/02/theunrecognizable-internet-of-1996.html.
3. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470–72 (daily ed. Aug 4, 1995).
4. See id.
5. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

635

636

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

conflicting approaches and judgments.6 The spreading of false and elicit
content online, in combination with contrasting court judgments, led
Congress to pass the Communications Decency Act (CDA)7 as part of
the Telecommunications Act of 19968. Included within the CDA are
several provisions now referred to as “Section 230,” codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 230,9 which grants immunity to providers of interactive computer
services (ICSP) from liability as “publishers” with respect to third-party
content appearing on their websites. While Congress envisioned § 230
as a way to promote the continued development of the Internet by
giving “Good Samaritan” ICSPs the authority to self-regulate thirdparty content posted on its websites and immunity from any resulting
liability, in effect “Bad Samaritan” ICSPs have also benefited from
§ 230’s immunity.10 As such, courts have struggled to balance the
legislative purpose of § 230 with the legislative text, which has often
created differing and controversial judgments.11
With respect to the controversy surrounding § 230, this Comment
focuses on the legislative history leading to § 230’s enactment, the
legislative text itself, and the differing interpretations of § 230 by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.
The Comment is organized as follows: Part II begins with a brief
explanation of defamation at common law and its relation to common
law “publisher” and “distributer” liability. Part II also addresses two
significant, early internet liability cases in which the courts made
differing interpretations and rulings with respect to assessing ICSP
liability for allegedly defamatory third-party content posted on their
respective websites. Part III discusses the legislative backdrop leading
to § 230’s enactment, along with a review of the legislative text of § 230.
Part IV discusses and evaluates the interpretations of § 230(c)(1)
adopted by various United States Federal Circuit Courts along with an
analysis as to which Federal Circuit’s interpretation best effectuates
Congress’s purpose for enacting § 230. Part V concludes by offering a
proposed modification to § 230(c)(1) to conditionally limit its grant of
6. Compare Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), with Stratton Oakmont v.
Prodigy Services Co., No. 31063-94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
7. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 113 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 560–61).
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56 (to be codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 609 et. seq.)
9. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2021).
10. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b); see Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016).
11. Compare Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), with Batzel v.
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
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immunity to ICSPs under specific situations in order to better achieve
the legislative purpose and policies of § 230.
II. BACKGROUND OF DEFAMATION AT COMMON LAW AND ITS
RELATION TO PUBLISHER AND DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY
A. Common Law Defamation
Defamation is a communication that tends to damage the plaintiff’s
reputation, to diminish the respect, good will, confidence, or esteem in
which the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse or unpleasant feelings
about the plaintiff.12
Under common law, to sustain a defamation claim, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant published, either by spoken (slander) or
written words (libel), defamatory material which concerned the plaintiff
and was directed to a third person. Further, the plaintiff must prove
that the statement was false, that the defendant was guilty of fault
equivalent to negligence or something greater, and that the plaintiff
suffered actual damages.13
First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “published” the
allegedly defamatory material. Publication means “‘communication, by
any method, to one or more persons who can understand the
meaning.’”14 Interestingly, defamation law may allow for liability to be
imposed on publishers and distributors, depending on their actions, who
disseminate allegedly defamatory material. A publisher, like a
newspaper publishing company, exercises “traditional editorial
functions . . . such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone
or alter content,” while a distributor, like a newsstand, plays no role in
the formatting or creating of the work and rather merely disseminates
the content.15
Because of the difference in roles played by a publisher and
distributor, courts have treated those who publish content different
than those who distribute content. Traditionally, courts have been less
willing to impose liability on distributors than publishers. At common
law, publishers “can be held liable for defamatory statements contained
in their works even absent proof that they had specific knowledge of the
statement’s inclusion,” while “distributors are not liable ‘in the absence
12. Peter Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 303, 307 (1987).
13. E. Alex Murcia, Developments in the Law: Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act: Why California Courts Interpreted It Correctly and What That Says About
How We Should Change It, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235, 239 (2020).
14. Id.
15. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
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of proof that they knew or had reason to know of the existence of
defamatory matter contained in matter published.’”16
B. Publisher Liability versus Distributor Liability–Common Law
A publisher is a person or business who prints or broadcasts material
themselves which has been submitted by others, like a book publisher,
newspaper publisher, and broadcast stations.17 Under standard common
law principles, a person who publishes a defamatory statement by
another is held liable for such statement as if he or she had initially
created it.18 Liability is further extended if another person reprints and
sells a defamatory statement already published by another. That person
would then become a publisher and subject to liability to the same
extent as if the person had originally published the defamatory
statement.19 Thus, a book publisher or a newspaper publisher can be
held liable for anything that appears within its pages. The theory
behind “publisher” liability is that a publisher has the knowledge,
opportunity, and ability to exercise editorial control over the content of
its publications.20
Distributors, such as bookstores, newsstands, and libraries,
distribute copies that have been printed by others. Distributor liability
is much more limited than that of a publisher, as distributors are
generally not liable for the content of the material that they distribute.
Moreover, a distributor, such as a bookseller, is under no duty to
examine the various publications offered for sale to ascertain whether
they contain any defamatory items, absent notice of the tortious
content.21 The concern is that it would be impossible for distributors to
read every publication, and ascertain the publications truth or falsity,
prior to selling or distributing it, and that as a result, distributors
would engage in excessive self-censorship.22
The key distinction at common law between a publisher and
distributor is that a publisher inherently has knowledge of the content
it is publishing, while a distributor does not. As a result, the law does
not impose liability on distributors unless they have knowledge or

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 (1977).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 (1977).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578 cmt. b (1977).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 cmt. c (1977).
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581 cmt. d-e (1977).
See id.
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reason to know that the information they are distributing is tortious or
unlawful.23
C. The Rise of the Internet and the Blurring of the Distinction Between a
“Publisher” and a “Distributor”
At common law, there was a clear distinction between a publisher
and a distributor, and the subsequent intermediary liability imposed
upon such actors. However, in the early 1990s, with the rise of the
internet came “internet intermediaries,” namely, websites containing
third-party content, which blurred this distinction.
In 1991, the first internet intermediary was sued for defamation in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,24 and unsurprisingly, the internet
intermediary attempted to argue that it was a distributor and not a
publisher of the content appearing on its website.25 In Cubby, Inc., the
defendant, CompuServe was the owner and developer of an “electronic
library” containing over 150 special interests forums, “comprised of
electronic bulletin boards, interactive online conferences, and topical
databases.”26 The electronic library included a journalism forum, which
CompuServe contracted out to Cameron Communication, Inc. (CCI), an
entity independent of CompuServe, to “manage, review, create, delete,
edit and otherwise control the [Journalism Forum’s] contents.”27
Included within the Journalism Forum was Rumorville USA, a daily
newsletter which reported on broadcast journalism. Rumorville USA
newsletters were created and uploaded by another entity and then
approved by CCI.28
The plaintiffs owned “Skuttlebut,” a computer database which
electronically published and distributed news and gossip regarding the
television and radio industries. Plaintiffs alleged that Rumorville USA
had published false and defamatory statements relating to Skuttlebut
and made it available on the journalism forum hosted by CompuServe.
The plaintiffs asserted that CompuServe should be held liable as a
publisher of the content developed by Rumorville USA because it made
Rumorville USA available to its subscribers and thus “published” the
material.29 The district court disagreed and found CompuServe to be a
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 14 (2020).
Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135.
Cubby, Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 138.
Id. at 137.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 137–38.
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“distributor” of content posted on Rumorville USA.30 In doing so, the
court concluded that CompuServe had the same minimal editorial
control over the publication of Rumorville USA as does a library,
bookstore, or newsstand, “and [that] it would be no more feasible for
CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for potentially
defamatory statements than it would be for any other distributor to do
so.”31
A few years later, in 1995, the same question regarding an internet
intermediary’s categorization as a publisher or distributor was analyzed
in the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County in Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.32 In Prodigy Services Co.,
Stratton Oakmont, a securities investment banking firm, brought a
defamation action against Prodigy Services Co. (Prodigy), the owner
and operator of an online website that allowed its users to exchange
messages on its bulletin boards.33 The alleged defamatory statement
was posted by a unanimous user on Prodigy’s “Money Talk” bulletin
board. The post included a statement that the president of Stratton
Oakmont committed criminal and fraudulent acts in connection with an
initial stock public offering.34 Stratton Oakmont was attempting to hold
Prodigy as the “publisher” of the allegedly defamatory bulletin post.35
Prodigy argued similar to that of CompuServe in Cubby, Inc, but the
Supreme Court of New York distinguished Prodigy’s role in the
publication process from that of CompuServe.36 In doing so, the court
relied upon evidence that Prodigy promulgated content guidelines, used
“Board Leaders” to enforce the guidelines by allowing them to remove
messages that violated such guidelines, and used a software screening
program which automatically prescreened all bulletin board postings
for offensive language.37 The court found that, unlike CompuServe
which had little or no editorial control of the content posted on its
database, Prodigy retained editorial control because of the
aforementioned systems and guidelines it had in place.38 Therefore, the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 140.
Id.
Prodigy Services Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *3–6.
Id. at *7–11.
Id. at *5–6.
Id. at *11.
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court determined Prodigy to be the publisher of the contents posted on
its bulletin boards.39
The court in Prodigy Services Co. emphasized that it agreed with
Cubby, Inc., and that it was “[Prodigy’s] conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, [which] opened it up to a greater liability
than CompuServe and other computer networks that make no such
choice.”40 However, instead of encouraging and empowering internet
intermediaries to self-regulate third-party content posted on its internet
sites, the court in Prodigy Services Co. seemingly incentivized an
entirely “hands-off” approach by internet intermediaries.41 In taking
both the Prodigy Services Co. and Cubby, Inc., decisions together, an
internet intermediary that restricted or edited third-party content on
its website faced a much higher risk of liability if it failed to eliminate
all defamatory material than if it simply did not try to control or edit
the content of third parties at all. Commentators then began to fear
that internet intermediaries would do just that and would stop
monitoring content entirely in order to retain its distributor shield from
defamation liability.42
III. THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
A. Overview
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was originally proposed not
for the purpose of protecting internet providers from defamation
liability, but rather was motivated out of a concern for the proliferation
of pornography and indecency on the internet and the easy access to
that material by the youth of America.43 On June 9, 1995, Senator
James Exon proclaimed that “[t]he fundamental purpose of the
Communications Decency Act [was] to provide much-needed protection
for children.”44 It was the first time in which the legislature sought to
regulate speech on the internet.
The CDA, which was passed by the Senate on June 15, 1995, and was
added to the Senate’s telecommunications bill, S. 652, (which later
became the Telecommunications Act of 1996), amended 47 U.S.C.

39. Id.
40. Id. at *13.
41. James P. Jenal, When Is a User Not a “User”? Finding the Proper Role for
Republication Liability on the Internet, 24 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 453, 459 (2004).
42. See id.
43. 141 Cong. Rec. S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
44. 141 Cong. Rec. S8088 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
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Section 22345 extending the antiharassment, indecency, and antiobscenity restrictions currently placed on telephone calls to
“telecommunications devices” and “interactive computer services.”46
Specifically, Senator Exon’s amendment to § 223(d) made it illegal to
use an interactive computer service to knowingly send to or display in
any manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment,
image, or other communication that, “in context, depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of
whether the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication.”47 Thus, the internet content provider, the person
posting the article or image that was unsuitable for minors, as well as
the internet intermediary who transmitted the unsuitable article or
image, would face criminal liability. Senator Exon’s amendment did
provide a good faith defense to protect internet intermediaries who took
“reasonable, effective, and appropriate” actions to prevent access to
offensive material by minors.48 Exon’s intent was for the CDA to target
internet content providers; however, he misunderstood the immensity of
the internet and the infeasibility of an internet intermediary to selfmonitor the content on its internet website.49
Around the same time, United States House of Representatives
members Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden introduced a freestanding
bill in the House in June 1995, as H.R. 1978, the Internet Freedom and
Family Empowerment Act.50 It was intended as an alternative to the
CDA.51 It was then offered as a standalone Cox-Wyden amendment on
the House floor during consideration of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 on August 4, 1995.52 In the words of Representative Cox during a
House hearing, the amendment’s purpose was twofold:

45. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2021).
46. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 502, §§ 223(d)(1)(B), (h)(2), 110 Stat. 133, 134–135 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(d)(1)(B), (h)(2)); 141
Cong. Rec. S8570 (daily ed. June 16, 1995)).
47. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, sec. 502,
§ 223(d)(1)(B).
48. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, sec. 502, § 223(e)(5).
49. 142 Cong. Rec. S714 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Exon, stating “[i]n
general, the legislation is directed at the creators and senders of obscene and indecent
information.”).
50. Internet Freedom and Family Empowerment Act, H.R. 1978, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995).
51. 141 Cong. Rec. H8468 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
52. H.R. Rep. No. 104–223, Amendment No. 2–3 (1995) (proposed to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 230).
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First, it will protect computer Good Samaritans, online service
providers, anyone who provides a front end to the Internet, let us say,
who takes steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their
customers. It will protect them from taking on liability such as
occurred in the Prodigy case in New York that they should not face
for helping us and for helping us solve this problem. Second, it will
establish as the policy of the United States that we do not wish to
have content regulation by the Federal Government of what is on the
Internet, that we do not wish to have a Federal Computer
Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the Internet
because frankly the Internet has grown up to be what it is without
that kind of help from the Government.53

Therefore, the amendment employed a more “hands-off” approach in
ensuring that online platforms regulated third-party content.54 As
described by Representative Cox, “[w]e can go much further [] than
blocking obscenity or indecency . . . [w]e can keep away from our
children things not only prohibited by law, but prohibited by parents.”55
The amendment protected providers of ICSPs from being held as a
“publisher” of defamatory or otherwise tortious third-party content, if
the ICSP, similar to Prodigy Services Co., moderated content.56 As such,
the amendment employed a strategy quite opposite to that of Senator
Exon who advocated for punishing ICSPs who incidentally provided
users with access to inappropriate content, essentially mandating that
ICSPs moderate user content. While not intentionally directed at
Senator Exon and his CDA, House member Bob Goodlatte, a co-sponsor
of the Cox-Wyden amendment, described the impracticality of requiring
internet providers to moderate user content, reasoning that,
“[t]here is no way that any of those entities, like Prodigy, can take
the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming in
to them from all manner of sources onto their bulletin board. We are
talking about something that is far larger than our daily newspaper.
We are talking about something that is going to be thousands of
pages of information every day, and to have that imposition imposed
on them is wrong.”57

53. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
54. Alex E Murcia, Developments in the Law: Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act: Why California Courts Interpreted It Correctly and What That Says About
How We Should Change It, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235, 243 (2020).
55. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
56. Id.
57. 141 Cong. Rec. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte).
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The House then proceeded to pass its version of the
Telecommunications Act with the Cox-Wyden amendment and without
Exon’s CDA, which was a resounding rebuke to the Exon’s increasingly
outdated approach.58
The Telecommunications Act, including the Cox-Wyden amendment,
would not be enacted until the following year. During that time
members of Congress continued to voice their opposition to Exon’s CDA
and instead encouraged the adoption of the Cox-Wyden Amendment.59
However,
on
February
1,
1996,
Congress
passed
the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 which, as recommended by the
conference committee, folded the Cox-Wyden Amendment into the
CDA.60 On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.61 The Cox-Wyden Amendment was
then codified as 47 U.S.C. § 230. Therefore, the CDA now contained two
competing visions of the emerging internet medium. Exon’s amendment
to 47 U.S.C. § 223 saw the internet as a new threatening medium in
which it was essential for the central government to implement harsh
monitoring standards in order to protect societies youth. On the other
side, the Cox-Wyden amendment saw the internet as an amplified way
to exchange information and sought to encourage ICSPs to step in and
determine which values portrayed on the internet were appropriate for
citizens.
It did not take long after the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was
passed for Exon’s amendment to be held unconstitutional.62 This
conclusion was not unforeseen. In 1995, the new House Speaker Newt
Gingrich was quoted in a New York Times article stating that Exon’s
amendment was “clearly a violation of free speech, and it’s a violation of
the right of adults to communicate with each other” and further adding
that Exon’s amendment would limit the internet to what censors
believed was acceptable for children to read.63 Unsurprisingly, on the

58. The Communications Act of 1995, H.R.1555, was approved in the House by a vote
of 305-117 on August 4, 1995; 141 Cong. Rec. 22084 (1995).
59. 142 Cong. Rec. S715 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996).
60. See H.R. Rep. No. 104–458 (1996). Section 502 of the final legislation contained
the Senate’s additions to 47 U.S.C. § 223. Section 509 contained of the final legislation
contained the House’s new Section 230.
61. The White House, President Clinton Signs the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE
(February
8,
1996),
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/EOP/OP/telecom/signing.html.
62. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
63. Edmund L. Andrew, Gingrich Opposes Smut Rule for Internet, NEW YORK TIMES
(June 22, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/22/us/gingrich-opposes-smut-rule-forinternet.html.

2022

THE “GOOD SAMARITAN” LAW

645

same day President Clinton signed the Telecommunications Act of
1996, twenty plaintiffs filed suit against the U.S. Attorney General and
U.S. Department of Justice challenging 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (Exon’s
amendment).64 Multiple federal court actions were consolidated, and by
the summer of 1997 the issue made its way to the Supreme Court of the
United States.65 On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court in Reno v.
American Civil Liberties Union, with the opinion authored by Supreme
Court Justice John Paul Stevens, held that § 223 violated the First
Amendment and therefore was unconstitutional. Specifically, Justice
Stevens concluded that § 223(d), Exon’s amendment, was unduly vague,
overly broad as to the breadth of its content-based restriction on speech,
and that other less restrictive means could have similarly advanced the
government’s interest of protecting youth from the prohibited
communications under § 223(d).66 The Supreme Court’s judgment ended
with Justice Stevens stating the speech restriction in the Exon
amendment amounted to “burning the house to roast a pig” and that
“[t]he CDA, cast[ed] a far darker shadow over free speech, threaten[ing]
to torch a large segment of the Internet community.”67 With that,
§ 223(d), was severed from the CDA, leaving the Cox-Wyden
amendment, § 230, to take the forefront on how internet content was to
be regulated.
B. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
Section 230 of the CDA, entitled “Protection for private blocking and
screening of offensive material,” is the main form of legal protection
afforded to online platforms from lawsuits over content posted by their
users.68 The main purpose, as previously described above, was to
establish a uniform federal policy applicable across the internet to avoid
the absurd results, under the common law scheme, as seen in Prodigy
Services Co.69 In Prodigy Services Co., Prodigy, an ICSP which ran an
internet bulletin board, was treated as a “publisher” of content that was
not their own simply due to the fact that Prodigy implemented systems

64. Reno, 521 U.S. at 861.
65. American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Shea ex
rel. American Reporter v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); ApolloMedia Corp. v.
Reno, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
66. Reno, 521 U.S. at 870–79.
67. Id. at 882.
68. 47 U.S.C. § 230.
69. Prodigy Services. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10–11.
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to restrict access to objectionable content.70 Due to the fact that Prodigy
was deemed a “publisher,” it was exposed to liability for defamation.71
As one commentator put it, § 230 sought to garnish the contrasting
interests and viewpoints of two groups, “those that wanted the nascent
commercial Internet to thrive with minimal regulation, and those that
wanted to ensure individuals and service providers had the tools to
filter pornography and similar content from the Internet.”72
C. Structure of Section 230
Section 230 is broken into six provisions. Section 230(a) sets forth
Congress’s preliminary finding, describing the benefits of the Internet,
its rapid development with limited government regulation, and its
increasing cultural significance. Congress’s finding are as follows:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive
computer services available to individual Americans represent an
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and
informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even
greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities
for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of
government regulation.
(5) Increasingly, Americans are relying on interactive media for a
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.73

Further, § 230(b), lays out the Congress’s policy aims of § 230 in
which Congress sought to allow the internet to develop based on the

70. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470–71 (daily ed. Aug 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); Prodigy
Services Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10–11.
71. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10–11.
72. Jeff Kossef, The Gradual Erosion of the Law That Shaped the Internet: Section
230’s Evolution Over Two Decades, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2016).
73. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a).
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principles of free market enterprise, rather than through immense state
and federal regulation. Congress’ policy aims for § 230 are as follows:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and
other interactive computer services and other interactive
media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which
maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization
of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to
restrict their children’s access to objectionable or
inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.74
The next provision, § 230(c), entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’
blocking and screening of offensive material,” addresses and attempts
to harmonize the two competing viewpoints as stated above. Section
230(c) is divided into two parts. Section 230(c)(1) states that the “[n]o
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider.” In other words, § 230(c)(1) overrules
Prodigy Services Co.75 Section 230(c)(2) affirms that ICSPs who make a
good faith effort to voluntarily edit or remove objectionable content
provided by others will be immune from liability.76
The statute goes on to clarify the meaning of an “interactive
computer service” (ICS) and an “information content provider.”77
Section 230(f)(2) defines an ICS as “any information service, system, or
access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or

74.
75.
76.
77.

47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
Prodigy Services Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10–11.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2).
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system that provides access to the Internet.”78 This definition covers
internet service providers (ISPs), like AT&T, companies who provide
internet hosting services, like Amazon Web Services, and websites,
apps, platforms, and other internet intermediaries that host user
content, like Facebook or Prodigy. Collectively, such actors are all
encompassed within the general term, provider of ICSPs. In order to
distinguish an ICSP who acts as an internet intermediary from an
individual or business who provides content to such intermediary,
§ 230(f)(3) defines an “information content provider” as “any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other
interactive computer service.”79
Notably, and important to the below discussion, § 230(e) clarifies the
statutes effect on other law. Specifically, § 230(e)(3) states that,
“[n]othing in this [Statute] shall be construed to prevent any State from
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of
action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”80 Therefore, § 230, as
applied to, for example, defamation, which is a state law cause of action,
ensures that providers of internet computer services are provided
immunity from defamation claims, where state law provides a remedy
not permitted by § 230.81
In recapping, § 230 provides two functions as laid out in § 230(c)(1)
and (c)(2). First, § 230(c)(1) protects ICSPs from liability when they act
only as intermediaries for the dissemination of third-party content.82
Second, § 230(c)(2) immunizes actions taken by ICSPs who in good faith
restrict user’s access to objectionable online material.83
For purposes of the remainder of the Comment, it will focus
specifically on § 230(c)(1) and the competing court interpretations that
followed after the statute’s enactment. In discussing the varying
interpretations of § 230(c)(1), pay close attention to the text’s plain
language along with how the courts seek to incorporate and utilize

78. Id.
79. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
80. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
81. Alex E Murcia, Developments in the Law: Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act: Why California Courts Interpreted It Correctly and What That Says About
How We Should Change It, 54 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 235, 244–45 (2020).
82. Thomas D. Huycke, Licensed Anarchy: Anything Goes on the Internet - Revisiting
the Boundaries of Section 230 Protection, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 581, 587 (2009).
83. Id.
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§ 230(a)’s congressional findings and § 230(b)’s policy aims into its
interpretation of § 230(c)(1).84
IV. SECTION 230(C)(1) INTERPRETATIVE APPROACHES USED BY
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS
A. The Overly Broad Interpretation of Section 230
The congressional intent and legislative history of § 230 reveal an
overall purpose of incentivizing ICSP self-regulation. However, soon
after § 230’s inception, confusion arose regarding who exactly qualified
for § 230’s immunity.85
In 1997, shortly after § 230 was enacted, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was the first federal court to interpret
the breadth of immunity under § 230(c)(1) applied to ICSPs in Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc.86 The plaintiff, Kenneth Zeran, brought an action
against America Online, Inc (AOL) claiming that AOL “unreasonably
delayed in removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified
third party, refused to post retractions of those messages, and failed to
screen for similar postings thereafter.”87 The plaintiff’s claims were pled
as negligence, but the appellate court found plaintiff’s claims to be
indistinguishable from a defamation action because the publication of a
statement is a necessary element in a defamation action.88
The plaintiff’s claims arose as a result of an unidentified person
posting messages on an AOL bulletin board advertising the sale of tshirts and other items which featured offensive slogans related to a
1995 Oklahoma City bombing.89 The ad went on to instruct those
wanting to purchase the items for sale to call “Ken” and further listed
the plaintiff’s home phone number. As a result, the plaintiff received
countless threatening phone calls. Multiple times the plaintiff contacted
AOL to remove the offensive posts to which he received assurances from
AOL that the posts would be soon removed. However, AOL failed to
remove the posts. The plaintiff’s suit against AOL was dismissed by the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia after
AOL responded to the Plaintiff’s complaint by asserting § 230 as an
84. Mark D Quist, “Plumbing the Depths” of the CDA: Weighing the Competing
Fourth and Seventh Circuit Standards of ISP Immunity under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 275, 284 (2012).
85. 141 Cong. Rec. H8469–H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
86. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 328 (4th Cir. 1997).
87. Id. at 328.
88. Id. at 332.
89. Id. at 329.
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affirmative defense. The district court granted AOL’s motion and the
Plaintiff appealed.90
On appeal, the Plaintiff argued that § 230(c)(1)’s bar against treating
an ICSP as the “publisher” did not bar suit against, and provide
immunity for, an ICSP as the “distributor” of the defamatory content.91
However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed, holding that the term
“publisher” historically encompassed “distributors” and “publishers.”92
The court reasoned that if ICSPs were subject to distributor liability
under the common law notice approach, they would face potential
liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory
statement, amounting to an impossible burden on such providers.93 The
court stated that the “notice-based liability would deter service
providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over
their own services,” which in and of itself would be against Congress’
§ 230 policy aim of encouraging ICSPs to self-regulate the
dissemination of offensive material over their services.94 The court
further alluded to the fact that liability upon notice would have a
“chilling effect” on the freedom on internet speech.95
In affirming the judgement of the district court, the court concluded
that § 230’s plain language created a federal immunity to any cause of
action seeking to hold ICSPs liable for content originating from a thirdparty user of the service.96 Therefore, “lawsuits seeking to hold a service
provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions[,] such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content[,] are barred [by § 230].”97
B. Zeran’s Section 230 Broad Immunity Interpretation Becomes the
Dominant Interpretation Across the Nation
Following Zeran, federal circuit courts quickly began adopting, and
even extending, Zeran’s broad reading of § 230(c)(1).98 For example, in
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recording LLC,99 the United States Court

90. Id. at 329–30.
91. Id. at 331.
92. Id. at 332.
93. Id. at 333.
94. Id. at 331, 333.
95. Id. at 333.
96. Id. at 331, 333.
97. Id. at 330.
98. Danielle K Citron and Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just Backpage:
Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 460 (2018).
99. 755 F.3d 398, 401 (6th Cir. 2014).
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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that, in general, an ICSP was
immune from liability under § 230, even if the provider partially
developed content which was the subject of a cause of action.100 In that
case, the plaintiff brought a defamation claim against the owner and
operator (the defendant) of www.TheDirty.com (The Dirty) after several
posts about the plaintiff appearing on the website.101 The Dirty, an
ICSP, is a website which allows users to anonymously upload
comments, photographs, and videos which the defendant then selects,
edits and publishes along with the defendant’s own editorial comments.
The district court denied the defendant’s motion for judgement as a
matter of law which was premised on the defendant’s argument that
the plaintiff’s claims were barred by § 230(c)(1).102 On appeal at the
Sixth Circuit, the plaintiff asserted that the defendant was not immune
under § 230(c)(1) because the defendants were “information content
providers with respect to the information underlying Jones’s
defamation claims because they developed that information.”103
However, the Sixth Circuit held that the defendant did not materially
contribute to the tortious content and was thus immune from liability
under § 230(c)(1).104
In Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC,105 which was later superseded by a
2018 amendment to the CDA, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit affirmed a district court’s motion to dismiss, based on
§ 230(c)(1)’s immunity, even though the plaintiffs’ claim alleged that the
defendant, Backpage, an internet provider of online classified
advertising, facilitated and encouraged illegal conduct through its
structuring of its website.106 In Backpage.com, the plaintiffs, victims of
sexual assault as a result of being sex trafficked through the use of
defendants’ website, brought suit claiming that Backpage engaged in
the sex trafficking of minors in violation of the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008107 and that Backpage engaged in
unfair and deceptive acts in violation of Massachusetts consumer
protection laws. The Plaintiffs alleged that Backpage selectively
removed certain postings made in the “Escorts” section of the website
which were posted by victim support organizations and tailored its

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 415.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 409.
Id. at 415.
817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
Id. at 15.
18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2021).
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posting requirements to make sex trafficking easier. Also, the plaintiffs
alleged that Backpage’s rules and requirements governing the posting
and contents of advertisements were designed to encourage sex
trafficking, citing that Backpage did not require phone or email
verification and employed a faulty age verification system.108 The First
Circuit noted that third-party content, the advertisements of escort
services, appeared as an essential component of each of the Plaintiffs
claims.109 In explaining the issue that results from the above premise,
the court explained that the plaintiffs are attempting to treat Backpage
as the publisher or speaker of content supplied by third parties, which
is exactly what § 230 set out to resolve by granting ICSPs immunity. In
affirming the judgment of the district court, the First Circuit held that
“[s]howing that a website operates through a meretricious business
model is not enough to strip away [§ 230(c)(1)] protections.”110
In addition to the above federal circuit rulings which construed
§ 230’s immunity broadly, many other circuits courts did just the same.
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
in Doe v. Myspace Inc.,111 affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiffs’ claims finding that they were barred by § 230.112 The Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant, MySpace, an early internet social
media provider, was immune from liability for allegedly failing to
implement safety measures that would have prevented a minor, the
plaintiffs’ daughter, from being contacted by a sexual predator.113
Further, the court concluded that the plaintiffs’ “allegations [were]
merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable for publishing
the communications and they speak to MySpace’s role as a publisher of
online third-party-generated content.”114 Additionally, in Obado v.
Magedson,115 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed that § 230 barred plaintiff’s claims against numerous internet
service providers and search engines for allegedly republishing
defamatory content.116 Moreover, in Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ.
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,117 the United State Court of

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 16–17.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 29.
528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 415.
Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 420.
612 F. App’x 90 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 91–4.
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, affirmed the dismissal, based on § 230
immunity, of the plaintiff’s claim which alleged that Craigslist, an
internet advertisement posting website, violated the Fair Housing Act
because certain housing and rental postings on its site were
discriminatory.118 In affirming that the plaintiff’s cause of action was
bared by § 230(c)(1), the Seventh Circuit stated that “given § 230(c)(1)[,
the plaintiff] cannot sue the messenger just because the message
reveals a third party’s plan to engage in unlawful discrimination.”119
Since the Fourth Circuit’s Ruling in Zeran, which held that § 230
gave broad sweeping immunity from liability to ICSPs, many other
federal circuit courts have followed as summarized above, even in
situations where granting immunity to ICSPs clearly went against
Congress’ policy aims of preserving the vibrant and competitive free
market of the internet and eliminating disincentives for internet
providers to remove objectionable material.120 As such, Zeran’s broad
interpretation of § 230(c)(1) has been extended in many federal circuit
courts beyond defamation cases to a wide variety of disputes, thus
providing immunity to ICSPs who allegedly designed policies to enable
illegal activity, partially developed third-party content, allowed users to
post illegal content, republished third-party content, etc.121 In effect,
federal circuit courts, as seen in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Six, and
Seventh Circuits, have provided unconditional, blanket immunity to
ICSPs against claims which relate to third-party content.122
C. Interpretive Shift in the Ninth Circuit
Other federal circuit courts have adopted Zeran’s Fourth Circuit
ruling in 1997 broadly interpreting § 230 immunity. However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has continually
provided a differing interpretation.123 The Ninth Circuit has recognized
118. Id. at 668.
119. Id. at 672.
120. 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(1), (b)(4).
121. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., 519 F.3d 666; see also
Magedson, 612 F. App’x 90; MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d 413; Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12; Dirty
World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398; Danielle K Citron and Benjamin Wittes, The
Problem Isn’t Just Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453,
460 (2018).
122. See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327; see also Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under
Law, Inc., 519 F.3d 666; Magedson, 612 F. App’x 90; MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d 413;
Backpage.com, 817 F.3d 12; Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 755 F.3d at 401; Citron,
supra note 121, at 460.
123. See Jeff Kossef, The Gradual Erosion of the Law That Shaped the Internet:
Section 230’s Evolution Over Two Decades, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2016).
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a number of fact-specific, narrow exceptions to § 230(c)(1) that have not
been recognized by other federal circuits.124
For example, in 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Batzel v. Smith,125 was presented with the question of
under what circumstances a moderator of a listserv and operation of a
website who posted allegedly defamatory third-party content could be
held liable.126 A handyman, Smith, was doing work in a person’s house
when he noticed old European style paintings hung on the walls.127 In
thinking that the paintings may be stolen, Smith then sent an email to
the Museum Security Network, which maintains a website and email
newsletter about museum security and stolen art, notifying the
organization of his alleged beliefs.128 The director of the Museum
Security Network, after receiving Smith’s email, published the email
message with some minor word changes on the Museum Security
Network’s listserv and website.129 However, Smith maintained that “he
never ‘imagined his message would be posted on an international
message board or he would never have sent it in the first place.’”130 The
plaintiff, the owner of the house which was worked on by Smith, later
found the published messages and sued the Museum Security Network
for defamation. The district court denied the operator’s motion to strike,
declining to extend § 230’s grant of immunity to the defendant.131 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit, while remanding the case back to the district
court for additional fact-finding, carved out a narrow exception to
§ 230(c)(1)’s immunity.132 The Ninth Circuit held that an internet
service provider is not immune from liability under § 230(c)(1) when a
third person or entity that created or developed the information in
question furnished it to the ICSP under circumstances in which a
reasonable person in the position of the ICSP could not conclude that
the information was provided for publication on the internet or other
interactive computer services.133 In carving out the narrow § 230
exception, the court reasoned that “[t]he congressional objectives in
124. Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d
1096 (9th Cir. 2009); Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016); Lemmon
v. Snap, Inc., 995 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2021).
125. 333 F.3d at 1018.
126. Id. at 1020.
127. Id. at 1020–1.
128. Id. at 1021.
129. Id. at 1022.
130. Id. at 1032.
131. Id. at 1020.
132. Id. at 1035.
133. Id. at 1034.
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passing § 230 [] are not furthered by providing immunity in instances
where posted material was clearly not meant for publication.”134
Then, in 2008, in Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,135 the
Ninth Circuit, in applying its reasoning consistent with Batzel,
concluded that a website which helps develop unlawful content by
materially contributing to the alleged illegality of the conduct is barred
from receiving § 230(c)(1)’s grant of immunity.136 In Roommates.com,
the plaintiffs (The Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley and
San Diego) alleged that the defendant (Roommates) violated the
Federal Fair Housing Act by creating discriminatory questions asking
for sex, family status, and sexual orientation, along with the choice of
answers which a user was required to select. Plaintiffs also claimed that
Roommates designed a discriminatory search filtering process to limit
listing available to user’s based on sex, family status, and sexual
orientation.137 In reversing the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’
claim based on § 230(c)(1) immunity, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
the defendant did more than provide a framework that could be utilized
for an illegal purpose. The court stated that “Roommate’s work in
developing the discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers and
discriminatory search mechanism [was] directly related to the alleged
illegality of the site.”138 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant
was an “information content provider” because it made material
contributions to the development of the illegal content on the website.139
Therefore, the defendant, as an information content provider, was not
given § 230(c)(1) immunity from liability.140
Next, in 2009, the Ninth Circuit, in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,141 held
that § 230(c)(1) grant of immunity would not cover an ICSP sued for
promissory estoppel if it voluntarily undertook to do something that the
CDA otherwise would not require, such as removing user content.142 In
Yahoo!, the plaintiff alleged claims of negligent undertaking and breach
of contract under a promissory estoppel theory against Yahoo!, Inc.
(Yahoo). Yahoo, among many other things, ran a website in which
Yahoo members could create a public profile page with information and

134.
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136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
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photos about themselves which was viewable by other Yahoo members.
The plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend, after a breakup, created a profile for the
plaintiff without her authorization. The profile page included nude
photos of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s private contact information.
The plaintiff repeatedly sent letters by mail to Yahoo asking for the
profile to be removed. Eventually, a high-level communications director
at Yahoo called the Plaintiff and stated that she would “‘personally
walk the statements over to the division responsible for stopping
unauthorized profiles and they would take care of it.’”143 The plaintiff
allegedly relied on this statement and took no further action. However,
the profile was not removed for two months until the plaintiff filed the
lawsuit.144
In Yahoo!, the district court held that both claims were barred by
§ 230(c)(1). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that § 230(c)(1) barred
the negligent undertaking claim holding that failing to remove content
necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the
content it failed to remove, which is exactly what § 230 sought to
prevent.145 As to the promissory estoppel claim, the court concluded
that it was not barred by § 230(c)(1) and remanded it back to the
district court.146 The court reasoned that Yahoo’s contract liability
would not come from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, like the negligent
undertaking claim, but rather “from Yahoo’s manifest intention to be
legally obligated to do something, which happen[ed] to be removal of
material from publication.”147
Then, in 2016, the Ninth Circuit, in Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc.,148
applied the court’s reasoning in Yahoo! that § 230(c)(1)’s immunity only
applies to causes of action which require the court to treat the
defendant as the publisher or speaker of third-party content provided
by another and does not apply to causes of action which are not
premised on the publication of third party-content to a different cause
of action.149 In Internet Brands, the plaintiff alleged that two rapists
used a modeling website, Model Mayhem, which defendant owned, to
lure her to a fake audition. Further, the plaintiff alleged that the

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 1098–9.
Id. at 1099.
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defendant knew about the rapists and failed to warn her or other
users.150
In Internet Brands, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s
negligent failure to warn claim after concluding plaintiff’s claim was
barred by § 230(c)(1).151 The plaintiff appealed the district court’s
dismissal. The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff’s claim was not
bared by § 230(c)(1) because the plaintiff “[was not seeking] to hold
[defendant] liable as a ‘publisher or speaker’ of content someone posted
on the Model Mayhem website, or for [defendant’s] failure to remove
content posted on the website.”152 Additionally, the court explained that
its ruling was furthered by the premise that the duty to warn would not
require the defendant “to remove any user content or otherwise affect
how it publishes or monitors such content.”153
Again, in 2021, the Ninth Circuit, in Lemmon v. Snap, Inc,154
continued their approach of limiting § 230(c)(1)’s grant of immunity to
causes of action solely seeking to hold the defendant as the publisher or
speaker of third-party content provided by another.155 In Lemmon, the
plaintiff sued Snap, Inc, a social media app provider, for its negligent
design of its smartphone application, Snapchat. Specifically, the
plaintiff claimed the “Speed Filter” encouraged users to drive at
dangerous speeds.156 In reversing the district court’s dismissal of
plaintiff’s claim based on giving the defendant § 230(c)(1) immunity, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiff’s negligent design lawsuit treated
defendant as a products manufacturer, namely, the creator of the speed
filter, and was not predicated on information provided by another
information content provider.157 Therefore, the court held that plaintiff’s
negligent design claim was not barred by § 230(c)(1).158
Since § 230 was enacted in 1996, two approaches as to the extent to
which § 230(c)(1) should provide immunity from liability to ICSPs took
the forefront. The Fourth Circuit in Zeran, which has been followed by
many federal circuits, opted for a broad interpretation, providing ICSPs
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with seemingly unlimited and unconditional immunity from liability.159
On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit approach demonstrates an
interpretative shift from that of Zeran.160 The Ninth Circuit has refused
to apply § 230(c)(1)’s immunity to ICSPs unless the cause of actions
relate directly to the publication of user or third-party generated
content.161 In effect, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation sets limits on the
kinds of claims covered by § 230(c)(1).162 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit,
has denied § 230(c)(1) immunity to those who, by their actions,
materially contribute to the development of illegal content, deeming
those actors to be “information content providers.”163 Therefore, in
deciding whether the Fourth Circuit or Ninth Circuit approach is the
correct interpretation of § 230(c)(1), the question becomes whether
Congress intended to give ICSPs blanket immunity, even if that meant
extending § 230(c)(1) immunity to “Bad Samaritans” or whether
Congress intended to give ICSPs conditional immunity, thus limiting
§ 230(c)(1) immunity to only “Good Samaritans”?164
D. Fourth Circuit Unlimited Immunity or Ninth Circuit’s Conditional
Immunity
When determining if a statute is working or being administered the
way in which legislatures intended, the legislative history will usually
reveal such anticipated framework of the statute. With regards to § 230,
the purpose of it is quite easy to ascertain. As previously mentioned
above, the purpose of § 230, as stated by Senator Cox in a 1995 hearing,
is to “protect computer Good Samaritans, online service providers,
anyone who provides a front end to the Internet, let us say, who takes
steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their customers.”165
Senator Cox clearly intended for “Good Samaritan” providers of
interactive computer services to be given certain protection from
liability.166 Additionally, in interpreting Senator Cox’s statement, it
seems as though a “Good Samaritan” ICSP is one that takes certain
159. See Zeran, 129 F.3d 327; see also Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d
398; Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., 519 F.3d at 668;
Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 16.
160. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1018; see also Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1157; Yahoo!,
570 F.3d at 1096; Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 846; Lemmon, 995 F.3d at 1085.
161. Yahoo!, 570 F.3d at 1096; Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 846; Lemmon, 995 F.3d at
1085.
162. See, e.g., Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851.
163. See, e.g., Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169–70.
164. Citron, supra note 121, at 468.
165. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
166. Id.
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steps to “screen indecency and offensive material for their
customers.”167 This notion is further supported by the title of § 230(c),
“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material.”168 In sum, it seems logical that certain conditions must be
met in order for such ICSPs to be immune from liability.
However, the Fourth Circuit in Zeran, concluded that the defendant,
AOL, a provider of interactive computer services did not have to take
any steps in order to be deemed a “Good Samaritan” and granted § 230
immunity. In other words, the Fourth Circuit gave AOL “unconditional
immunity” from liability.169 In Zeran, an unknown actor posted
defamatory messages on an AOL bulletin board, which because of the
content of the messages caused the plaintiff to receive endless
threatening phone calls. The plaintiff contacted, on multiple occasions,
AOL representatives, and on multiple occasions received assurances
that the posts would be removed. However, the posts were not removed,
prompting the plaintiff to sue AOL for its unreasonable delay in
removing the defamatory messages.170 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s dismissal of the case based on AOL’s § 230 immunity,
holding that “notice-based liability would deter service providers from
regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own
services.”171
In countering the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Zeran, it is important to
note that the plaintiff’s causes of action were separate from and had
nothing to do with the content of the messages posted on AOL’s bulletin
board. 172 The causes of action were focused on the steps taken, or lack
thereof, by AOL in removing the defamatory posts, after giving
assurances that the posts would be removed. The Fourth Circuit’s
opinion focused solely on “notice-based liability,” and how ICSPs should
not be subject to “notice-based liability.”173 While this notion is correct,
the Fourth Circuit failed to mention or discuss the “reasonability” of
AOL’s actions after receiving notice and affirmatively, through its
representative, agreed to take action by removing the defamatory posts
on the online bulletin board. While not mentioned in § 230 itself, but
implicit in Congress’ intent, “reasonability” of an ICSPs’ action should
be the foundation in determining whether an ICSP receives § 230

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id.

660

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

immunity. In essence, and along with Congress’ policy at stated in
§ 230(b)(1), the actions of an ICSPs should be “reasonable” in order to
promote the continued development of the internet.174
The Ninth Circuit, in cases such as Roommates.com and Yahoo!,
while not directly mentioning this self-termed, “reasonability”
approach, did appear to be basing their judgements in part on the
actions taken by the ICSPs prior to and subsequent of the third-party
content being posted, published, or created on their respective
websites.175 For example, in Roommates.com, where the Fair Housing
Councils of the San Fernando Valley and San Diego sued Roommates
alleging that Roommate’s business violates the federal Fair Housing
Act (FHA), the claim arose out of third-party content, namely, listings
seeking to find roommates posted by individuals, on Roommates’
website.176 Instead of halting the discussion there, as did the court in
Zeran, and granting § 230 immunity to Roommates, the Ninth Circuit
took a step back to dive into how such discriminatory third-party
content came about.177 The Ninth Circuit determined that Roommate’s
work in developing the discriminatory questions, the discriminatory
answers, and the discriminatory search mechanism amounted to a
material contribution to the alleged illegality of the listings posted on
Roommates’ website.178 Because of the material contributions to the
contents of the illegal listings, the court held Roommates to be an
information content provider and not immune from liability.179
The Roomates.com holding articulates an important concept that
“[t]he Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless
no-man’s-land on the Internet.”180 This concept is consistent with
§ 230’s policy of promoting the continued development of the internet.181
With the aforementioned concept in mind, along with Congress’ purpose
of enacting § 230 as demonstrated in the congressional records, the
Ninth Circuit’s approach of granting immunity conditionally is the most
correct approach to administering § 230(c)(1) immunity.

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1033; 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1169; see also Yahoo!, 570 F.3d at 1107.
See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165.
Id. at 1166–9.
Id. at 1165.
Id.
Id. at 1164.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).
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V. PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO SECTION 230(C)(1)
In order to effectuate the Ninth Circuit’s approach that § 230(c)(1)
immunity should only apply conditionally to ICSPs, this Comment
seeks to propose a modification to § 230(c)(1). The proposed modification
will (1) create a “reasonability” requirement which must be met for an
ICSP to receive immunity, (2) clarify the extent to which an ICSP can
republish, select, edit, and add content without being deemed the
internet content provider, and (3) clarify and limit § 230(c)(1) immunity
to only those claims which arise out of the publication of content by a
third-party content providers.
The proposed modification to § 230(c)(1) changes the language from,
“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider”182 to the following:
A provider or user of an interactive computer service that materially
induces, develops, contributes to, or in combination of the like,
information provided by another, or that does not take reasonable
steps to address unlawful uses of its service that created actionable
harm to others shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
such information provided by another information content provider
in any action arising out of the publication of content by that
information content provider.

The proposed modification reverses the current format of § 230(c)(1)
by stating the conditions which an ICSP must meet in order to be
granted § 230 immunity. In effect, the proposed modification limits the
scope of § 230(c)(1) immunity. The modification ensures that defendant
ICSPs, such as Roommates in Roommates.com, must prove, as a
condition to receiving § 230(c)(1) immunity that the content in question
was not materially induced, developed, contributed, or in combination
thereof by, the defendant. By including this within § 230(c)(1), all
federal circuit courts will have ample guidance through the legislative
text to ensure a similar analysis of the ICSP’s conduct similar to that of
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Roommates.com. Further, hopefully this
modification will eliminate results, such as in Dirty World Entm’t
Recordings, where the Sixth Circuit surprisingly held that the owner
and operator of The Dirty, an ICSP, who selected, edited, added
commentary, and published content provided by another, did not
become the information content provider, and thus eligible for § 230
immunity.183 With the text of the proposed modification the way it is, a
182. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
183. But see Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d at 403, 415–7.
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court should have ample guidance to access whether an ICSP’s actions
amounted to that of an information content provider.
The proposed modification also implements a reasonableness
standard with respect to whether a defendant ICSP employed
reasonable content moderation practices when its internet website is
confronted with unlawful activity that creates or effectuates actionable
harm to other individuals. With the implementation of a reasonableness
standard, courts will assess, as a condition prior to granting § 230
immunity, whether the defendant provided adequate safety measures
or adequate content take-down policies. As a result, the implementation
of a reasonableness standard prevents “Bad Actors,” such as Backpage
in Backpage.com who faced allegations that its online classified
advertising website facilitated and encouraged illegal conduct through
the structuring of its website, from receiving unfettered § 230
immunity.184 With the proposed modification, Backpage, for example,
would have had to provide evidence that it implemented reasonable
safety, take-down, and user verification policies in order to address the
known unlawful uses occurring on its website, namely, sex trafficking of
underage victims. Backpage would likely not have been able to prove
that it had reasonable policies in place, and thus would not have been
granted § 230 immunity.
The likely pull back by dissenters to a reasonableness approach
would be that such a standard is too vague or not well defined as to
what conduct by an ICSP is reasonable or unreasonable. In countering
the likely argument, it should be noted that courts have assessed the
reasonableness of practices in a multitude of varying fields and contexts
ranging from negligence law to criminal law, as seen by the “reasonable
care” standard, “reasonable prudent person” standard, “reasonable
consumer” standard, and the “reasonable person” standard.185 Further,
similar to the way in which a court applies the “reasonable prudent
person” standard, here the court would have to tailor its analysis of
reasonability based on the alleged harmful conduct in question.186
The last part of the proposed modification resolves the struggle faced
by all federal circuit courts in deciding whether or not a plaintiff’s claim
is covered within § 230(c)(1)’s grant of immunity. As such, the proposed
modification clarifies that § 230(c)(1) immunity applies “in any action
arising out of the publication of content by that information content
provider.” In the alternative, this means that any action not arising out
184. But see Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 22.
185. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Reasonableness In and Out of Negligence Law, 163 PENN.
L. REV. 2131, 2161 (2015).
186. Zipursky, supra note 184.
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of an ICSP’s publication of third-party content is not barred by § 230
immunity. By including this addition to § 230(c)(1), a court no longer
has to make the difficult determination, as demonstrated by both the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits of whether the claim is premised on and
involves treating the ICSP as the publisher of the content in
question.187 Now, the court has to answer a far simpler question of
whether the plaintiff’s claim is based on underlying third-party content.
If the plaintiff’s claim is not based on underlying third-party content
and rather, for example, as correctly concluded by the Ninth Circuit in
Yahoo!, a negligent undertaking by an ICSP to take some action which
is relied on by the plaintiff, then the claim is not barred by § 230(c)(1)
immunity.188 In addition to the Yahoo! judgement, the added “arising
out of” language should amount to judgements, going forward,
consistent with Ninth Circuit holdings in both Internet Brands and
Lemmon where the Ninth Circuit did not award immunity to “Bad
Samaritans” when the claims were premised solely on the ICSP’s
actions, conduct, and decisions.189
Additionally, the proposed modification increases the burden, as in
the elements to satisfy, on ICSPs who assert § 230(c)(1) as an
affirmative defense to claims alleged by a plaintiff. 190 Under the
proposed modification, an ICSP who claims immunity from liability by
asserting § 230(c)(1) as affirmative defense will need to establish, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant, (1) is a provider
of an interactive computer service, (2) is being treated as the
publisher or speaker of speech provided by another information
content provider, (3) that the action is arising out of the publication of
content by that information content provider, (4) if applicable, that the
provider of interactive computer services did not materially induce,
develop, contribute to, or in combination of the like to, information
provided by that information content provider, and (5) if applicable,
that the provider of interactive computer services took reasonable steps
to address unlawful uses of its service that created actionable harm to
others. Ideally, the proposed modification will make it more difficult
for ICSPs to have a plaintiff’s case dismissed at the outset of
litigation, and thus will lead to further litigation of the facts
underlying a plaintiff’s claim.

187. See Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 20; See Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851.
188. See Yahoo!, 570 F.3d at 1108.
189. See Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 851; see also Lemmon, 995 F.3d at 1093.
190. Eric Taubel, The ICS Three-Step: A Procedural Alternative for Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act and Derivative Liability in the Online Setting, 12 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 365, 376 (2011).
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In sum, the proposed modification balances the underlying
purposes of § 230’s enactment while balancing the policies as listed in
§ 230(b). The proposed modification effectuates § 230’s purpose of
“protect[ing] computer Good Samaritans, online service providers who
takes steps to screen indecency and offensive material for their
customers” and the like, as well as effectuating § 230’s policy of
promoting the continued development of the Internet.191 The proposed
modification, unlike the current § 230(c)(1) provision, now protects and
grants conditional immunity to “Good Samaritan” providers of
interactive computer services, while allowing “Bad Samaritan”
providers of interactive computer services to be held accountable for
their actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the court’s rulings in both in Prodigy Services Co. and Cubby,
Inc., which saw the lower courts’ struggle to apply common law
publisher and distributor liability in the context of content
disseminated on an ICSP’s website, Congress made an attempt to
eliminate an ICSP’s liability for content provided by a third-party as a
way to ensure the continued advancement of the internet.192 However,
§ 230(c)(1) immunity, in theory, was intended to apply only to “Good
Samaritan” ICSPs. The Fourth Circuit, beginning with Zeran,
interpreted § 230(c)(1) as providing broad and nearly unlimited
§ 230(c)(1) immunity to virtually all ICSPs facing claims related to
content provided on its website.193 Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of § 230(c)(1), the Ninth Circuit, in cases such as
Roommates.com, Batzel, Yahoo!, Internet Brands, and Lemmon, took a
different stance, holding that § 230(c)(1) only provides ICSPs with
conditional immunity in certain claims and fact specific
circumstances.194 The Ninth Circuit’s approach of conditionally granting
§ 230(c)(1) immunity better effectuates the purpose of § 230’s enactment
by protecting and thus granting immunity to “Good Samaritan” ICSPs,
while allowing for plaintiffs to hold accountable “Bad Samaritan”
ICSPs.

191. 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox); 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(1).
192. See Prodigy Services. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *10–11; see also Cubby,
Inc., 776 F. Supp. at 140.
193. Accord Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; 331–3.
194. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1018; see also Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1157; Yahoo!,
570 F.3d at 1096; Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 846; Lemmon, 995 F.3d at 1085.
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The proposed modification seeks to alter the text of § 230(c)(1) to
mirror the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit.195 In doing so, the
proposed modification only grants immunity when the content in
question was not materially induced, developed, contributed, or in
combination thereof by the defendant ICSP. Further, the proposed
modification requires that in certain circumstances, an ICSP would
have to demonstrate that it employs reasonable content moderation
practices when its internet website is confronted with unlawful activity
that creates or effectuates actionable harm to other individuals. Finally,
the proposed modification clarifies that § 230(c)(1) immunity does not
apply to ICSPs when the cause of action does not arise out of the
publication of content provided by an information content provider.

195. See id.

